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THE LEGAL RHETORICAL STRUCTURE FOR THE
CONVERSION OF DESEGREGATION LAWSUITS TO
QUALITY EDUCATION LAWSUITS
Kevin Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal opinions are influenced by social and political struggles that exist
outside of the legal system. These extra-legal considerations will often
shape strategies and influence what particular plaintiffs request in the
form of relief from the legal system. This is particularly true of public
school de jure segregation litigation because it has important extra-legal
political and social implications. If the understanding of legal opinions
and strategies pursued by various litigants is limited to a focus on purely
judicial considerations of a given issue, important extra-legal factors and
considerations that serve to structure the litigation will be missed. There-
fore, in order to fully understand the impact of legal opinions in school
desegregation cases, it is necessary to situate those opinions in the broader
social and political context which produce and structure the issues
presented to the judicial system for resolution.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Freeman v. Pitts' has the potential to
set off a new round of debate, particularly in African-American communi-
ties around the country, about racially separate as opposed to integrated
education.2 The Court's opinion in Freeman gives federal district courts
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. The author would like to thank Profes-
sors Theodore Shaw and Brian Landsberg for their insightful and helpful comments. The author
would also like to thank Cheryl Peebles for her exceptional research assistance and Krystie Herndon
for her exceptional secretarial assistance. Finally, this author would like to dedicate this Article to the
memory of the late Professor Dwight Greene of Hofstra Law School. Through numerous discussions
and interactions over the past several years, Professor Greene has been an inspiration and a motivator
to the author in forcing him to subject his ideas to a far more rigorous examination than he otherwise
would have.
112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
2 I want to define the following terms that will be used in this Article, in order to avoid confu-
sion about them. I will use the term "segregation" to mean legally required racial separation. I will
use the term "desegregation" to refer to court-ordered racial balancing of public schools. I will use the
terms "racially separate" or "separate" to refer to the concept of voluntarily choosing racially separate
public education. Finally, I will use the term "integrated" education to refer to bi-racial education of
blacks and whites. The term "integration" can therefore encompass the term "desegregation."
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broad discretion in determining whether partial withdrawal of court su-
pervision over a formerly de jure segregated school system is warranted.8
The Court approved the district court's release of supervision over por-
tions of the DeKalb County School System, including student assignments,
while maintaining control over other aspects of the school system. It also
approved the district court's order of specific remedial measures aimed at
equalizing the quality of education provided to the existing de facto segre-
gated black and white schools. Freeman sets up the possibility for Afri-
can-American communities-acting through black plaintiffs and their
lawyers-to ask a district court to terminate its control over student as-
sigriments, while maintaining control over other aspects of the school sys-
tem. This can be done in order to assure, through court supervision, that
existing and resulting racially imbalanced schools are provided with equal
educational resources, including equal funding, even while retaining their
racial imbalance. The effect of the Court's opinion in Freeman, therefore,
was to convert a desegregation lawsuit into a quality education lawsuit. In
the aftermath of Freeman v. Pitts, many African-American communities
will once again revisit the question of whether the educational interest of
black school children is best served by separate as opposed to integrated
education.
This Article will elucidate the rhetorical advantage in the African-
American community for those groups who prefer to convert desegregation
lawsuits into quality education lawsuits. In order to do that it is necessary
to situate the debate about these potential conversions into their historical
context. First, I will briefly discuss the issue of integrated as opposed to
separate education as it has been debated by the African-American com-
munity throughout America's history. I will then discuss the Supreme
Court's opinion in Freeman v. Pitts to illustrate its ability to spark a new
debate about the sagacity of integrated as opposed to racially separate ed-
ucation under the guise of converting desegregation lawsuits into quality
education lawsuits. I will then focus on the analytical framework erected
by the Supreme Court to justify school desegregation as the primary rem-
edy for de jure segregation. Legal justification for the continued mainte-
nance of desegregation-as opposed to converting to quality educa-
tion-must be carried out by lawyers whose arguments must be conducted
within the limits of this analytical framework. I believe that proponents of
3 Id. at 1446.
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separate education are now in a stronger rhetorical position than propo-
nents of integrated education. The rhetorical advantage that exists for pro-
ponents of conversion to quality education rests in the structure of the
Supreme Court's analytical framework that led to ordering desegregation.
I will therefore conclude this Article by highlighting that rhetorical ad-
vantage. The advantage stems from the fact that proponents of quality
education are in a much stronger position to appeal to notions of racial
pride and abilities of African-Americans to solve their own problems than
proponents of continued desegregation.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEBATE REGARDING SEPARATION AS
OPPOSED TO INTEGRATION IN EDUCATION
In the larger American society, African-Americans are a subgroup who
share a distinctive phenotype. The historical domination and subordina-
tion of those with this distinctive phenotype has forged a separate subcul-
tural group from a number of different black ethnic groups that were
brought to America. Against the historical background of racial domina-
tion, African-Americans have forged a separate set of cultural ideas, atti-
tudes, opinions, and beliefs regarding American society, how it works, and
African-Americans' place within it. In this cultural ideology, which has
grown up alongside the dominant American cultural story about African-
Americans, the African-American community has been active in a process
of self-formation. 4 This cultural ideology can be thought of as a counter
discourse to dominant American culture. It conceptualizes the social world
4 Lois Weis, in an ethnographic study of black students in an integrated community college,
noted that for black students the relationship to education is paradoxical. African-Americans, she
claims, do not consciously reject school and knowledge, but tend to behave in ways that make school
success unlikely. While expressing a strong desire for education in order to escape poverty, they tend
to be excessively tardy and to lack a serious attitude and perserverance toward their school work. In
an effort to interpret this paradoxical situation, she has suggested that it may be that blacks have
developed high educational aspirations as a result of their long history of collective struggle for equal
education as a form of opposition against white people who denied them access to education and equal
educational opportunity. Hence, the high educational aspirations are a result of the collective struggle
against racial oppression. But African-Americans find that their collective struggle for equal education
has not worked for them in the same way as it has for whites. Consequently, the behavior that
undermines their success in school is a form of opposition in an effort to distance themselves from
schooling. The oppositional nature of African-American culture can therefore account both for high
educational aspirations and for behaviors that undermine the ability to achieve success in school. See
John U. Ogbu, Class Stratification, Racial Stratification, and Schooling, in CLAss, RAC E & GEN-
DER IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 170-171 (Lois Weis ed., 1988) (discussing Lois Weis' work).
19931
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primarily as a struggle by African-Americans against racial oppression
and domination. This counter discourse holds the key for understanding a
counter interpretation of the behaviors and attitudes expressed by African-
Americans from that contained in the dominant American cultural belief
system.5 Given the conception of the social world which this counter dis-
course is built upon, it is not surprising to find that one of its core beliefs
is a high degree of skepticism and mistrust towards whites and the institu-
tions which they control.'
The debate over separate versus integrated education in the African-
American community is part of this overall cultural narrative. As an issue
for blacks, this debate did not commence in the 1950s with the prelude to
Brown v. Board of Education.7 This debate is, in fact, almost as old as
the American political union itself.
One of the first places where separate versus integrated education was
debated by the black community was in Boston, Massachusetts. Shortly
after the American Revolution, Boston began the process of organizing the
first urban public school system in the nation.8 At a town meeting in
1789, three writing schools and three reading schools were established in
Boston for the instruction of children between the ages of seven and four-
teen." The early Boston school law did not exclude blacks from attendance
at these community schools.10 Within one year, however, "vex and insult"
had driven all but three or four black students from Boston's community
schools.1 Hosea Easton, a black who had been enrolled in the Boston
community schools, recalled that his former school teachers sent bad
youngsters, white and black, to the so-called "nigger seat," telling them
such things as they would be as poor or ignorant as a nigger, or have no
5 I am not trying to suggest that African-Anerican culture is better or worse than the dominant
cultural ideology in American society, only that it is differerdt, Nor do I wijh to suggest that there is
one undifferentiated African-American cultute. Certainly, African-American culture will vary based
upon geographic, religious, class, color, and gender variationg.
8 See Ogbu, supra nte 4, at 172-78.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
a STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, THE CULTURE FACTORY: BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1789-1860, at
172 (1973).
' See ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY AND
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 304-05 (Houghton Mifflin 1947) (1919).
10 SCHULTZ, supra note 8, at 161.
11 Arthur 0. White, The Black Leadership Class and Education in Antebellum Boston, 42 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 504, 505 (1973).
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more credit than a nigger.12
It was in Boston, within the context of discrimination in integrated
schools, that blacks made their first request for publicly funded separate
education. The parents of Boston's black school children wanted to satisfy
their desire that their children receive a quality education, and also shield
them from the prejudice they would be subjected to in integrated schools. 13
In 1787, Prince Hall delivered a petition from Boston's black community
to the legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The petition
requested that the legislature order the Boston School Committee to estab-
lish a school for Boston's black community." The petition was denied by
the Massachusetts legislature. Despite this setback, the pursuit of separate
schools for blacks in Boston continued.
In 1798, a school for "colored children" under the charge of Elisha
Sylvester, a white man, was established in the house of Prince Hall.15
Two years later Boston's black community presented a funding request
for separate schools for blacks to the Boston School Committee. The citi-
zens of Boston, in a special town meeting called to consider the question,
refused to. grant the request.," In 1812, however, the School Committee
agreed to take over funding and control of a private school started by
blacks. By 1830, a completely segregated public school system for black
children had developed, consisting of three primary schools. 7
Even as Boston moved towards its publicly funded separated school sys-
tem, the seeds of discord regarding the sagacity of racially separate educa-
tion had already been sown. Parents of the African-American children
12 HOSEA EASTON, A TREATISE ON THE INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER AND CIVIL AND POLrrI-
CAL CONDITIONS OF THE COLORED PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PREJUDICE ExER-
CISED TOWARD THEM 40-43 (Boston, Knapp 1837); see also SCHULTZ, supra note 8, at 160 (point-
ing to the fact that the lack of attendance at Boston schools by blacks was also a result of the
deplorable economic condition of the black community in Boston).
'3 SCHULTZ, supra note 8, at 160.
U4 Prince Hall et al., Petition to the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Bay in General Court Assembled (Oct. 17, 1787), in 1 A DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (Herbert Aptheker ed.,
1969).
15 C. G. WOODSON, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO PRIOR TO 1861, at 95 (1919). Woodson
calls him Primus Hall, but he is also known as "Prince Hall." See 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, at 19.
36 WOODSON, supra note 15, at 95.
17 SCHULTZ, supra note 8, at 167.
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attending the separate schools had complained about the education their
children were receiving in them for some time. David Walker, for exam-
ple, often criticized the separate schools, arguing that they did not provide
adequate educational instruction for black children. 8 In addition, there
was no high school provided for the black children as there was for the
white children. The reason given by white officials was simply that black
children did not need to go to high school.19
In 1833 an investigation of the Boston schools revealed the "obnoxious
contrast between the low and confined room" in which blacks were edu-
cated and the convenient and healthful accommodations offered to white
children.20 In addition, the teachers at the black school were often paid
considerably less than those at the white schools.21 The separate black
schools were systematically under-funded and many of the subjects offered
in the white schools of the district were not offered in the schools attended
by blacks.22 In effect, the black school children were being deprived of the
resources necessary for effective education.
In 1844, Thomas Dalton led a group of seventy of his neighbors to
demand that their children be allowed to attend the district schools for
whites. This demand was rebuffed. This round of attempting to eliminate
racial separation in the Boston schools eventually led to the case of Rob-
erts v. Boston.2" There the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld
the authority of the Boston School Committee to segregate the schools.
Success, however, finally came to the proponents of integrated schools
when the Massachusetts General Legislature passed a law in 1855 mak-
ing segregation illegal.24
The debate over separate versus integrated education also arose during
18 DAVID WALKER'S APPEAL, reprinted in HERBERT APTHEER, ONE CONTINUAL CRY:
DAVID WALKER'S APPEAL TO THE COLORED CITIZENS OF THE WORLD (1829-1830), at 98 (1965).
"9 SCHULTZ, supra note 8, at 166.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 166-69.
White, supra note 11, at 512.
OS 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). The United States Supreme Court, when it upheld the segre-
gation statute presented to it in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1896), cited Roberts v.
Boston to show that the states had long legitimized de jure segregation.
"' White, supra note 11, at 513. For a recent reexamination of the contemporary Boston school
desegregation litigation, see RONALD P. FORMIsANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND
ETHNICrrY IN THE 1960s AND 1970s (1991).
[Vol. 42
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the state constitutional conventions in the former Confederate states fol-
lowing the Civil War in 1867 and 1868. Prior to the Civil War there had
been no general system of public education in the South. The first massive
effort in the South at constructing a public education system was the re-
sult of reconstruction after the Civil War. Because of white resistance to
integrated schools, however, the heated debates that occurred in nearly
every state convention regarding the issue of public school segregation
were to a large degree only theoretical.25 One commentator noted that the
freed slaves who voiced their opinion in support of integrated education
cared less for the higher principles involved, but were more concerned
with practical considerations of quality and effectiveness.2" Separate
schools would mean inferior schools in the sense that these schools would
be underfunded. 7 As long as the education was on a nonsegregated basis,
though, the black students were not vulnerable to the systematic un-
derfunding of their schools. 28 Professor John Hope Franklin has noted
that many white southern legislators during the segregation period were
not adverse to reducing educational expenditures for both black and white
students. Even so, they would go as far as possible in cutting the funds for
the black schools before trimming the budgets of the white schools.29
"' Most of the state conventions avoided the issue of segregation by tabling motions either to
mandate or to prohibit segregated schools. No state constitution required that schools be segregated,
and only two-South Carolina and Louisiana-forbade segregation in public schools. In practice,
however, desegregation prevailed only at the University of South Carolina and in several Louisiana
elementary schools, mostly in New Orleans. The ability to successfully desegregate some schools in
New Orleans resulted partially from its cosmopolitan ethnic heritage. Because of the spectrum of
colors in New Orleans it was difficult to tell where black and white began and ended. Nevertheless,
the efforts to integrate schools caused several thousand white children to transfer to private schools or
to drop out all together. The admission of blacks to the University of South Carolina in 1873, too, was
of dubious success. Nearly all the whites withdrew, so that by 1875, 90% of the students were black
and the remaining few whites were mostly the sons of carpetbaggers or Northern missionaries. JAMES
M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 537, 575-76 (1982).
11 MEYER WEINBERG, A CHANCE TO LEARN: THE HISTORY OF RACE AND EDUCATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 51-52 (1977).
'7 HORACE MANN BOND, EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER 56
(Octagon 1966) (1934).
2' The expenditures per student for white schools even during the Reconstruction years of the
1870s was reported to be 30% to 40% higher than those at the black schools. MCPHERSON, supra note
25, at 577.
2' John Hope FranklinJim Crow Goes to School, 58 S. ATLANTIC Q. 225, 234-35 (1959). The
segregation versus desegregation debate was also touched off when in 1863 Chicago passed the Black
School Law mandating segregation for childien attending school. The refusal of black parents to
comply with the law helped lead to its repeal two years later. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE POLITICS
1993]
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As virtually everyone knows, the debate over segregated versus inte-
grated schools raged again during the 1950s and 1960s3° in the prelude
and aftermath of Brown v. Board' of Education3 l and Green v. County
School Board.32 In short, the debate over the conversion of desegregation
lawsuits into quality education lawsuits is just the latest chapter in a two
hundred year old debate about the best educational interests of blacks.
Arguments surrounding the issue of integrated as opposed to segregated
schools within the African-American community have been articulated
against a cultural backdrop of mistrust of dominant American society. Ra-
cially separate education controlled by the African-American community
provides educators with the opportunity to tailor the educational programs
of schools to the needs and interests of African-Americans. The historical
downside of racially separate education, however, is that it leaves African-
American children systematically vulnerable to hostile and insensitive
treatment in the form of systematic deprivation of the educational re-
sources needed to effectively educate their children."3 Integrated education
increases the difficulty of systematically depriving African-American chil-
dren access to sufficient educational resources. 4 In racially mixed schools,
OF SCHOOL REFORM, 1870-1940, at 111 (1985). During the discussions of the Blair Education Bill in
the 1880s the issue of segregated versus desegregated education was once again vigorously debated. See
HAROLD W. CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL: A CRITICAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND MINORITIES AND
AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCIETY 14-18 (1987).
30 See, e.g., STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS
OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967) (Carmichael, who was the former chairperson of the Student
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee ("SNCC"), is now known as Kwame Toure); HAROLD W.
CRUSE, THE C~isIs'OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL (1967); CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN
BLACK AND WHITE 249-307 (1964); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (Alex
Haley ed., 1965).
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
During the days of "separate but equal," the funding of schools for blacks seldom approached
equality. For example, South Carolina spent eight times as much for whites as for blacks in 1930.
This gap was closed to three times as much by 1945. In Mississippi a 9 to I adverse ratio in 1929 was
still 4.5 to 1 in 1945. Even federal funds allocated to the states for vocational education and teacher
training were apportioned inequitably. Blacks, who were 21.4% of the population in the states with
segregated schools received only 9.8% of the federal dollars in the mid-1930s. See DIANE RAVITCH,
THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION 1945-1980, at 121 (1983); see also Paul Gewirtz,
Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728,
776 (1986) (noting that money always follows white students); Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation
Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1041 (1984) (arguing that segre-
gation harmed African-Americans because they were powerless to partake of an educational program
that was not hostile to them).
" Shane, supra note 33, at 1104-27.
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however, African-American children are often confronted with hostile and
alienating learning environments, because these schools are typically
geared towards the educational needs and interests of the white majority
children. 5
III. FREEMAN V. P=S
The DeKalb County School System ("DCSS") is located in a suburban
area outside Atlanta, Georgia. In 1968, African-American school children
and their parents instituted a federal class action suit in the Northern
District of Georgia challenging DCSS' de jure segregation.3" After the suit
was filed, DCSS worked out a comprehensive desegregation plan with the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The district court ap-
proved the proposed plan and entered a consent order in June, 1969.
Under the plan, all of the former de jure black schools in DCSS were
closed and their students were reassigned to the remaining neighborhood
schools. The district court found that DCSS was desegregated for a short
period of time under this court-ordered plan.4'
According to the Supreme Court, between 1969 and 1986 respondents
sought only infrequent and limited judicial intervention.38 Between 1969
and 1986, however, the population in DeKalb County grew significantly.
Whites migrated to the northern part of the county while African-
Americans migrated to the southern part.3 9 In 1969, African-Americans
made up only 5.6% of the student body of DOSS. By the 1986-87 school
year, however, their percentage had increased to 47%. A significant
amount of racial imbalance in student school assignments also existed in
DCSS. Over half of the African-American students attended schools that
35 See RAYMOND C. RisT, THE INVISIBLE CHILPREN; SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN AMERICAN
SOcIETY (1978). For one year, the author followed a group of young black children bused to an
urban, middle-class, and largely white school. The principal applied a policy of treating all students
alike, which in practice meant that the black children were expected to perform and behave no differ-
ently than did the white children from the comfortable suburbs. The result was disastrous for the
black children. Id.; see also JAMES A. BANKS, MULTIETHNIC EDUCATION 161-64 (2d ed. 1988)
(noting that even when schools assert that their educational program is multicultural it still retains its
Anglo-centric orientation).
:' Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1436 (1992).
7 Id. at 1439.
3 Id. at 1437.
39 Id. at 1438.
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were over 90% black and 62% of them attended schools where more than
67% of the students were black (20% more than the system-wide average).
Of the white students enrolled in DCSS, 27% attended schools that were
over 90% white and 59% attended schools where the percentage of white
students exceeded by 20% the system-wide percentage of white students.' 0
Despite the amount of racial imbalance in the schools, in 1986 the
School Board filed a motion for final dismissal of the litigation. In order to
determine whether DCSS had eliminated the vestiges of its prior de jure
conduct, the district court examined the "Green factors.' 14  Even though
there was significant racial imbalance in student assignments, the district
court found that DCSS was unitary not only with regard to student as-
signments, but also in the areas of transportation, physical facilities, and
extracurricular activities.4'2 The district court concluded that the racial im-
balance of the students was attributable to the rapid demographic shifts
that had occurred in. DeKalb County and to other factors, but not to the
prior unconstitutional conduct of DCSS.
4
Even though the district court concluded that the racial imbalance was
not the result of prior unconstitutional conduct, the district court did not
ignore the implications of a significant amount of racial imbalance. Be-
cause of the existence of such a large amount of racial imbalance, there
were many schools in the system that were predominately black or pre-
dominately white. The district court specifically compared the quality of
education DCSS provided to its students in its predominantly black
schools with that provided to the students in the white schools. Not only
did the district court examine resource allocation, but it also examined
40 Id.
41 In Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991), the Court stated that in considering
whether the vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated as far as practicable, the district court
should look not only at student assignments, but also to existing policy and practice with regard to
faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities, and facilities (the "Green factors").
42 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1440-42.
"' Id. at 1440. The district court examined the interaction between DCSS policy and the demo-
graphic changes in DeKalb County. Of the 170 changes made by DCSS, only three were found to
have had a segregative effect, and that effect was considered minor. The district court concluded that
DCSS had achieved maximum practical desegregation. It found that the existing segregation of stu-
dents was attributable to demographic shifts that were inevitable as the result of suburbanization, the
decline in the number of children born to white families, blockbusting of formerly white neighbor-
hoods which led to a highly dynamic real estate market in DeKalb County, and the completion of
Interstate 20, which made access from DeKalb County into the City of Atlanta much easier. Id.
[Vol. 42
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measures of student achievement. The district court found that DCSS as-
signed experienced teachers and teachers with graduate degrees in a ra-
cially imbalanced manner."" It also found that DCSS spent more money
educating white students than it did on the education of black students.45
The district court ordered DOSS to equalize per pupil expenditures
and to assign experienced teachers and teachers with advanced degrees
equally between the primarily black schools and the primarily white
schools."6 The district court also concluded that vestiges of the dual segre-
gated system remained in the areas of teacher and principal assignments
(one of the Green factors).4 However, it rejected the notion that DCSS
had not done enough to improve the educational performance of black
students, specifically citing improvements by DCSS' black students on the
Iowa Tests of Basic Skills and on the Scholastic Aptitude Test.4
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's incremental
approach to the elimination of vestiges of prior de jure conduct. It held
that the district court erred in considering the six Green factors as sepa-
rate categories.4 In order for a school system to achieve unitary status, the
court said, it must satisfy all of the Green factors at the same time for at
least three years. 50 The Eleventh Circuit also held that a system that had
once been segregated by law could not justify continued racial imbalance
by pointing to demographic changes, at least until the system had eradi-
cated all vestiges of segregation.51 Since DCSS had not done this, the
Eleventh Circuit held that it bore the responsibility for the current racial
imbalance and had to correct that imbalance. 52
Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1442 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
'5 Freeman, 887 F.2d at 1442.
46 Id. at 1450.
47 The district court found that, while there had not been any intentional segregation, DCSS had
not maintained a ratio of black to white teachers and administrators in each school proportional to the
ratio of black to white teachers and administrators throughout the system. Black principals and ad-
ministrators were overrepresented in schools with high percentages of black students and under-
represented in schools with low percentages of black students. In addition, teachers in white schools
tended to be better educated and to have more experience than their counterparts in schools with
disproportionately high percentages of black students. Moreover, per pupil expenditures in predomi-
nantly white schools exceeded those in predominantly black schools. Id. at 1441-42.
4' Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1441-42.
", Freeman, 887 F.2d at 1446.
:0 Id. at 1450.
1' Id. at 1449.
52 Id. at 1448.
1993]
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In a majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court
agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Green factors could be
considered separately and that partial relinquishment of supervision and
control of a school system in an appropriate case does not offend the Con-
stitution.5" Justice Kennedy's opinion emphasized that the decision to
withdraw supervision lay in the sound discretion of the district court."
The factors that should be considered by a district court in determining
whether partial withdrawal is warranted include:
[W]hether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the
[court] decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is
being withdrawn; whether retention of judicial control is necessary
or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets
of the school system; and whether the school district has demon-
strated, to the public and to the parents and students of the once
disfavored race, its good faith commitment to the whole of the
court's decree and to those provisions of the law and the constitution
that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first
instance. 55
Justice Kennedy went on to note that in considering these factors a
court should give particular attention to the school system's record of com-
pliance, stating that "[a] school system is better positioned to demonstrate
good-faith commitment to a constitutional course of action when its poli-
cies form a consistent pattern of lawful conduct."5'
'3 Justice Kennedy stated:
We hold that, in the course of supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the
authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental stages,
before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school operations .... [U]pon a
finding that a school system subject to a court-supervised desegregation plan is in compli-
ance in some but not all areas, the court in appropriate cases may return control to the
school system in those areas where compliance has been achieved, limiting further judicial
supervision to operations that are not yet in full compliance with the court decree. In
particular, the district court may determine that it will not order further remedies in the
area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to
constitutional violations.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445-46. Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and by Justices White, Souter, and Scalia. In addition to joining the opinion of the Court, Justices
Scalia and Souter also wrote separate concurring opinions.
" Id. at 1446.
55 Id.
58 Id.
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Since both parties to the litigation agreed that quality of education was
a legitimate subject of inquiry for the district court and neither party chal-
lenged the court's retention of supervision, the Court indicated that it was
not necessary for it to examine this issue. 57 The Court went on to note
approvingly, however, that the district court's consideration of quality of
education illustrated the fact that the Green factors were not to be a rigid
framework. 5' Given the fact that the Supreme Court approved the inquiry
into issues related to quality of education, it is certainly within the discre-
tion of the district court to consider such factors in determining whether
partial release of court supervision is warranted.
The Court's opinion in Freeman v. Pitts has the potential to set off a
new round of debates, particularly in many African-American communi-
ties around the country, about racially separate as opposed to integrated
education. The Court's opinion in Freeman gives district courts broad dis-
cretion in determining whether partial withdrawal of court supervision
over a former de jure segregated school system is warranted.59 In sub-
stance, the Court approved the district court's release of supervision over
student assignments, but it also approved the district court's decision to
maintain control over other aspects of the school system in order to assure
equity in the provision of educational resources. In effect, the Court ap-
proved the conversion of a school desegregation lawsuit into a quality edu-
cation lawsuit.
The Freeman opinion sets up the possibility for African-American
communities-acting through black plaintiffs and their lawyers-to ask a
district court to terminate its control over student assignments, and yet
maintain control over other aspects of the school system. This can be done
in order to assure that existing and resulting racially imbalanced schools
are provided with equal educational resources, including equal funding.
This raises the core issue of separate as opposed to integrated education
for black school children.
I' d.
Id. at 1446-47.
5 Id. at 1445-46.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
HARM OF DE JURE SEGREGATION
Our legal system consists of rules which define their proper sphere of
application. These rules are structured around a certain conception of so-
cial reality. This conception of social reality is in turn validated by our
legal system through its dictation of the kinds of arguments that are per-
suasive within legal institutions. In order to show why those advocating
conversion of desegregation suits into quality education suits are in the
stronger rhetorical position, it is necessary to explicate the Supreme
Court's analytical framework for resolving de jure segregation in public
schools. Legal arguments addressing the issue of continued desegregation
or conversion to quality education lawsuits must take place within the
confines of this framework. The handicap for advocates of continued de-
segregation is built into the analytical framework in which this issue will
be argued.
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court also stated that a school system
eliminates the vestiges of an unconstitutional de jure system when the in-
juries and stigma inflicted upon the disfavored race are no longer pre-
sent."0 This statement captures the paradoxical nature of the Supreme
Court's analytical framework with which those seeking remedies for de
jure segregation must contend. On the one hand, the Court indicates that
the harm of de jure segregation was an amorphous one of stigma. On the
other hand, the Court also states that the harms were tangible, manifest-
ing themselves in some quantifiable way on African-Americans.
There is an important distinction between viewing the harm of de jure
segregation as one of stigma and viewing the harm as tangi-
ble-psychological, emotional, associational, or educational. According to
the former, the harm was the dissemination of the stigmatic message to
the community at large that in some important ways African-Americans
are "less than" Caucasians. Under this view of the harm, the belief that
African-Americans were "less than" Caucasians is viewed as unfounded
and irrational. The purpose of remedies for de jure segregation is to stop
government from disseminating this message. According to the latter,
however, segregation actually made African-Americans inferior to Cauca-
80 Id. at 1443.
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sians. Under this view, such beliefs are not irrational, though the deficit
condition of African-Americans is presumed to be curable. Under this
view the purpose of remedies for de jure segregation is therefore directed
at improving African-Americans in hopes of bringing them up to the stan-
dard of whites.
As a result of this analytical framework, the process of curing the ves-
tiges of de jure segregation involved two contradictory elements. On the
one hand, public schools were dismantling de jure segregation with its
concomitant message that African-Americans were second-class citizens.
But at the same time, desegregation-the primary remedy for de jure seg-
regation-was being invested with the same sort of meaning concerning
the second-class nature of African-Americans. As a result, a new message
about the second-class nature of African-Americans was being
disseminated.
A. Stigma as a Harm of De Jure Segregation
In order to get a better handle on the Court's school desegregation anal-
ysis, I would like to explicate the concept of stigma. The stigmatic harm
of de jure segregation in public schools results from what has amounted to
government dissemination of a message to the community at large that
African-Americans are unworthy of respect.61
Issues of race discrimination are resolved by interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The primary conception
of social reality embodied by the Supreme Court's interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment generally envisions American society as a collec-
tion of individuals independently pursuing their own ends and employing
the means to these ends which they find most appropriate.62 These
"knowing individuals" of our society are viewed as autonomous, indepen-
41 The idea that segregation is unconstitutional because it is racially insulting was first suggested
in the legal academic literature by Professors Black and Calm. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawful-
ness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30
N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955).
.2 One of the "basic concept[s] of our system [is] that legal burdens should bear some relation-
ship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175 (1972). For the influence of individualism in areas of constitutional law, see City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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dent, self-directed, coherent, self-defining, and free-willed.13 Their social
action is presumed to be controlled by their intent or preferences.
The conceptual structure of society as a collection of knowing individu-
als has its own rules for organizing and interpreting social events and for
defining the role of government. The role of government is to determine
the rights and responsibilities-as well as to settle the disputes that arise
-among these knowing individuals in a manner that allows each individ-
ual to pursue their own desires, and to prevent them from unjustly inter-
fering with the rights of other persons.64 The role of government is there-
fore envisioned as striving to achieve a sort of neutrality that respects
equally every knowing individual's pursuit of their various objectives. 6 5
Neutrality requires that the reasons motivating governmental decision-
making must not be biased toward any particular individual or group. If a
governmental entity makes its decisions based upon the interest of a par-
ticular group, as opposed to the interest of society at large, or fails to
respect the dictates of individuality, then it is violating the constraint of
neutrality.
The conceptual structure that governmental decisions should treat peo-
ple as individuals carries with it an implied method in which government
"5 This view of the individual in society can be attributed to the demise of the medieval unitary
world view. KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE 13 (1936); see also Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV.
167, 181 (1990); Seyla Benhabib, Critical Theory and Postmodernism: On the Interplay of Ethics,
Aesthetics, and Utopia in Critical Theory, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435 (1990).
These "knowing individuals" who populate society know few, if any, limits on their ability to
understand the world. Understanding and reasoning therefore occur between individuals who are, or
at least can, operate in a universal intellectual dimension. See Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cogni-
tive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. Rv. 1195, 1211 (1989). The notion of the individual as un-
bounded in its ability to perceive ideas provides a conception of the individual as one that is standing
outside of the boundaries of the inquiry and experience and therefore is able to adjudicate the validity
of the arguments being made. Id. at 1215.
The ability of the individual to exercise unbounded reason has been criticized from a number of
different perspectives. For a criticism of this concept in its relationship to normative legal thought, see
Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 181 (1990).
For a fascinating case dealing with attempts by religious adherents to attack the law's vision of
social reality as merely one of many competing world views, see Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827
F.2d 684 (1lth Cir. 1987). In this case the plaintiffs attempted to have 44 textbooks used in Mobile
County Public Schools banned because the books advanced the religion of secular humanism. Id. at
686-88.
" Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race
Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1988).
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should treat differences involving characteristics which individuals do not
choose, such as race, ethnicity, and gender. This conceptual structure
leads inexorably to a standard whereby government should treat the indi-
viduals who compose our society as devoid of such characteristics as race,
ethnicity, or gender. When government, for example, makes decisions mo-
tivated by racial considerations, it is treating people as members of a ra-
cial group rather than as individuals. This violates the fundamental indi-
vidualist conception of society. This colorblind normative conception
generally means that there is no distinction between governmental deci-
sions which benefit a racial minority group and ones which harm that
group, because taking into account a characteristic which individuals do
not choose-race-is the violation. Rather than acknowledging any differ-
ences regarding race, government should-absent compelling justifica-
tions-ignore them in favor of treating people as individuals.6
De jure segregation of public schools was a system of administrative
rules and regulations founded upon the classification and separation of
students based on race.67 The stigmatic harm of de jure segregation flowed
from the symbolic message embodied in the practice. In retrospect, that
message was clear-de jure segregation was based upon and symbolized
the belief that blacks were not the equal of whites.68
The dissemination of this message was not limited to the physical segre-
gation of students and staff. Even though the Brown Court reasoned from
the proposition that the physical facilities and other tangible factors of the
black public schools were essentially equal to the white public schools, 9
ea Professor Gotanda, arguing against colorblind decision-making, very convincingly points out
that when we attempt to be racially colorblind, we really are not because we have already noticed race
and then tried to ignore it. A truly colorblind person would never notice the difference in the first
place. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18-19
(1991); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
67 At the time that the school segregation cases began their climb through the lower courts, state
constitutional provisions, state statutes, or local ordinances made segregated schools a requirement in
17 southern and border states and the District of Columbia. Four other states, Arizona, Kansas, New
Mexico, and Wyoming had legislation that permitted the maintenance of segregated schools on an
optional basis. ALBERT P. BLAusTmN & CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON, JR., SEGREGATION AND THE
LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES 6 (2d ed. 1962).
68 For a discussion of the symbolic meaning of de jure segregation, see Kevin Brown, Termina-
ion of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of
Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1122-25, 1128-33 (1990).
" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
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in three of the four state cases the physical facilities and other tangible
resources were not in fact equal.1 During the "separate but equal" epoch
in American society, the "equal" part of this doctrine was generally ig-
nored.1 The education of white children was generally considered more
important than that of their black counterparts. Consequently, the schools
that white children attended were better funded, with longer school terms,
more highly paid teachers, and better physical facilities than those for
blacks.72 The systematic undervaluing and underfunding of the education
70 In 1951, when the complaint in Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), rev'd sub
nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was filed, Claredon County spent $43 on the
education of each black student as compared to $166 for each white student. I.A. NEWBY, CHAL-
LENGE TO THE COURT 29 (1967). A three-judge federal district court had denied relief in this case,
but ordered the defendants to take steps to equalize the public schools promptly and to report back in
six months. Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 537-38. Subsequently, the three-judge district court found that the
county was equalizing the schools "as rapidly as was humanly possible." Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F.
Supp. 920, 922 (E.D.S.C. 1952).
In Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a three-judge district court in Virginia admitted the inadequacy of the
black school in Prince Edward County. 103 F. Supp. at 340. The panel simply ordered the school
board to pursue with "diligence and dispatch" the building program it had already commenced. Id. at
341.
In Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a decision by the Court of Chancery that or-
dered the admission of black students to previously whites-only schools. 91 A.2d at 140. The court
ordered the desegregation remedy because the schools attended by blacks were not physically equal to
those attended by whites. Id. at 152. The court, however, implied that segregation laws might be
enforced once the school facilities were equalized. Id.
See also JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935, at 148-83
(1988); HENRY ALLEN BULLOCK, A HISTORY OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH 216-19 (1967);
Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education for Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Confirmed, in
SHADES OF BROWN 108, 118-19 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
" The willful and flagrant violation of the equality portion of the Plessy principle has been
extensively documented. See, e.g., HORACE MANN BOND, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE
AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER (1934); HORACE MANN BOND, NEGRO EDUCATION IN ALABAMA: A
STUDY IN COTTON AND STEEL (1939); Louis R. HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1958); ROB-
ERT A. MARGO, DISENFRANCHISEMENT, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND THE ECONOMICS OF SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES SOUTH, 1890-1910 (1985); J. Morgan Kousser, Progressiv-
ismn-For Middle-Class Whites Only: North Carolina Education, 1880-1910, 46 J. S. HIsT. 169
(1980).
71 RAvrrcH, supra note 33, at 121. For example, in 1945, South Carolina spent three times
more per child for the education of white children then it did for black children. In 1930, South
Carolina actually spent eight times as much for the education of whites than it did for the education of
blacks. In the same year, Mississippi spent four and one-half times more per child on white schools
than for black schools. In 1929, Mississippi spent as much as nine times more for the education of a
white child than for a black child. Id.
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of African-Americans stemmed from the same belief that produced segre-
gated schools, and therefore were also complementary components of the
stigmatic message disseminated by de jure segregation."
Public schools that engaged in de jure segregation were therefore dis-
seminating a stigmatic message to the community at large. By disseminat-
ing this stigmatic message, government was violating the neutrality princi-
ple. Government was engaged in conduct that not only failed to treat
people as individuals, but was disseminating a stigmatizing message about
African-Americans.
B. Tangible Harms Flowing from De Jure Segregation
According to the Court, the harm of de jure segregation was not limited
to stigmatic harm, but included tangible harms as well. These tangible
harms can be characterized as psychological, emotional, associational, or
educational. The Court's most graphic elucidation of the tangible harms
flowing from de jure segregation was in Brown v. Board of Education
("Brown I ").74 In the search for a harm inflicted by segregation, the
Court specifically pointed to the presumed impact of segregation on Afri-
can-American school children.7 5 In one of the most quoted phrases from
73 Scientific racism had long been accepted to justify the Negro's place in the South. Before the
Civil War, science provided a major justification for pro-slavery thinking. See, e.g., WILLIAM STAN-
TON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTrrTUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA 1815-1859
(1960). Scientists such as Josiah Nott of Alabama, Samuel George Norton of Philadelphia, and Louis
Agassiz of Harvard were convinced of the innate inferiority of the slaves. They were able to buttress
their beliefs by drawing support from the latest research and most authoritative speculation in anthro-
pology, anthropometry, phrenology, and egyptology. NEWBY, supra note 70, at 8-9. These scientific
attitudes regarding the inferiority of blacks were not significantly altered by the Civil War or
America's ensuing period of Reconstruction. The mainstream of scientific thought after 1865 contin-
ued to articulate a belief in racial inequality. See, e.g., THOMAS F. GossETT, RACE: THE HISTORY
OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 253-86 (1963).
For a discussion of the views of segregationists regarding the inferiority of African-Americans, see
JAMES J. KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1962); NEWBY, supra
note 70.
74 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7' The Court's analysis in Brown I begins with the assumption that the physical facilities and
other tangible qualities of the public schools attended by black and white students were equal. Id. at
493.
The research by the psychologist purporting to show that African-Americans in public schools had
lower self-esteem has been the subject of criticism recently in WILLIAM E. CROSS, JR., SHADES OF
BLACK: DIvERsrrY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY (1990). He argues that the psychologist con-
fused racial group preference with self-esteem, assuming that racial group preference would corre-
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Brown 1,76 the Court said, "[t]o separate [African-American youth] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. ' ' "7 The
Court went on to quote approvingly from the district court in Kansas:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to
learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a ten-
dency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."
To begin with, the Court explicitly stated that segregation retarded the
educational and mental development of black children. In addition to these
tangible harms, the Court noted that African-American children in segre-
gated schools with equal physical facilities and other tangible factors7 9
spond automatically with self-esteem.
" Professor Derrick Bell has noted that proponents of integration quoted this phrase over and
over to justify their belief that integration provides the proper route to equality. Derrick Bell, The
Dialectics of School Desegregation, 32 ALA. L. REv. 271, 285 (1981).
" Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. The social science evidence cited by the Court, id. at 494 n. 11, was
specifically intended to prove that segregation produced a psychological harm to African-Americans.
Doubt has always been expressed as to whether the social science evidence cited in Brown I actually
influenced the Justices. See Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-58 & n.16
(1955); Ernest Van Den Haag, Prejudice About Prejudice, in THE FABRIC OF SocIErT (1957).
78 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting from the opinion of the district court in the Kansas case)
(emphasis added). Justice Kennedy's opinion in Freeman quotes this passage from Brown I as well.
See 112 S. Ct. at 1443. Two points from this passage should be highlighted. First, the Court notes
that segregation in and of itself has a detrimental effect only upon the black children. When sanc-
tioned by the law, this impact is only increased. And second, because the Court is eluding to the
existence of a harm that is unlikely ever to be undone, the impact of this harm was not limited to
children, but has also affected African-American adults, who obviously had already attended segre-
gated schools themselves.'
" Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492. The Court noted that
[i]n the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality.... In the South Carolina
case, the court below found that the defendants were proceeding 'promptly and in good
faith to comply with the court's decree' . . . . [Tihe Virginia Attorney General's brief on
reargument [indicated] that the [equalization] program has now been completed. In the
Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's equalization program was
well under way.
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were nevertheless deprived of the intangible benefits of a racially inte-
grated school."0 If one begins with an assumption of equality of physical
facilities and other tangible factors, then it becomes apparent that the in-
tangible difference between the white schools and the black schools is the
absence of whites in the latter. The valuable "intangibles" lacking in the
black schools, therefore, were attributes which must have been endemic
only to white teachers and students.
Finally, the Supreme Court has never justified any of its decisions in
the school desegregation cases by pointing to the benefits that white chil-
dren could derive from a racially integrated education. It is true that the
plaintiffs in most school desegregation cases were identified as black school
children, rather than school children. Nevertheless, to presume that Afri-
can-American students, and not whites, would be the only ones who prof-
ited from integrated education leads to the inescapable conclusion that
Caucasians are better than African-Americans."
The Court also based its opinion approving certain recommended edu-
cational programs on the belief that segregation inflicted some tangible
harms on African-Americans. In Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken II ") 82
the Court affirmed a district court order approving remedial educational
components as part of the remedy for de jure segregation of the Detroit
Public Schools.8 3 The educational components proposed by the Detroit
Id. at 492 n.9.
80 Id. at 494.
"' This point was also made in the late 1960s by Black Nationalists refering to integration:
'Integration' . . . is based on complete acceptance of the fact that in order to have a decent
house or education, black people must move into a white neighborhood or send their chil-
dren to a white school. This reinforces, among both black and white, the idea that 'white'
is automatically superior and 'black' is by definition inferior.
CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 55.
As indicated earlier, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Brown I started with the assumption that physical facilities and other tangible factors were equal.
This substantive equality was of course not always the case during the de jure segregation era. Conse-
quently, another conceivable tangible harm flowing from the de jure segregation era was the lack of
equal resources. However, the Supreme Court's opinion precluded the recognition of such a harm. I
have therefore not included it as one of the tangible harms recognized by the Court.
62 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
8 This case reached the Court because the State of Michigan objected to being made partially
responsible for funding this part of the remedy. The district court determined that Michigan was just
as responsible for the segregation of Detroit's public schools as the school system. Consequently, the
district court assigned responsibility for half of the cost of the educational components of the desegre-
gation plan to the Detroit Public School System and the other half to the State of Michigan. Id. at
277.
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School Board and approved by the district court fell into four categories:
reading, in-service training for teachers and administrators, revised testing
procedures, and counseling and career guidance.8 ' To justify the Milliken
H remedies, the Court once again focused on the presumed negative im-
pact of de jure segregation on African-American children. The Court, in
reference to the African-American school children who would continue to
attend segregated schools, stated that "[c]hildren who have been ... edu-
cationally and culturally set apart from the larger community will inevita-
bly acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cul-
tural isolation .... Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy
the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the consequences
linger . *..."85
In the above passages from Brown I and Milliken II it is evident that
the Court views the harm of de jure segregation as more than just stig-
matic, but also as retarding the cognitive, psychological, and emotional
development of African-Americans. It is also important to note that the
explicit acceptance of the defective condition of African-Americans
in Brown I was not limited to their children. According to the Court,
the harm was one that was unlikely ever to be undone. Since African-
American adults had previously attended segregated schools, that experi-
ence would continue to affect them long after they had left the educational
system.
Certainly the temptation exists to run to the aid of the Court's de jure
segregation opinions, especially Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown
I, and talk about the need to obtain unanimity or the need to write a
politically acceptable opinion in order to facilitate the coming desegrega-
tion of public schools. In Freeman, however, Justice Kennedy specifically
quotes the above passages from Brown I in order to elucidate the princi-
pal wrongs of de jure segregation.8" This reflects the fact that the current
Court still views these statements as ones that articulated the harm of de
jure segregation.
" Id. at 276.
" Id. at 287.
" For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's opinion, see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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C. Justifications for Racial Balancing as the Primary Remedy
Through maintaining de jure segregation, the state was disseminating a
stigmatic message about African-Americans. The stigmatic harm would
have been eliminated if government had ceased the conduct that dissemi-
nated the discriminatory message. This would have taken the state out of
the position of intentionally and affirmatively endorsing the belief in Afri--
can-American inferiority.
The ordering of racial balancing as a remedy for de jure segregation
requires that government treat people as members of a group rather than
as individuals. Therefore, the basic individualist principle of the legal sys-
tem appears to be violated by a race-based remedy. Elsewhere I have ar-
gued that virtually all of the remedies that the Supreme Court ordered or
approved for de jure segregation in public schools, including desegrega-
tion, could have been justified as a means of eliminating an additional
facet of the stigmatic harm of de jure segregation that was unique to pub-.
lic schools.87 Public schools are social institutions that cultivate America's
youth. They inculcate cultural values, including political and social atti-
tudes, opinions, andbeliefs to the next generation of American adults.8" In
the context of public schools, the stigmatic message carried with it the
additional harm of distorting the socializing process of public schools and
thereby inclucating this stigmatic belief into school children.
The Supreme Court, however, did not base its justification for ordering
desegregation on the elimination of this additional facet of the stigmatic
harm. This section will elucidate the justifications which the Supreme
Court relied upon to order desegregation as the primary remedy for de
jure segregation. It will also reveal the limited scope of the arguments that
proponents of continued desegregation are forced to advocate in order to
prevent conversion of quali~y education lawsuits.
In order to find out what the Supreme Court based its principal rem-
"' See Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to
Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. Rav. 1, 11-49 (1992).
88 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-79 (1979). For an extended discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's recognition of the value inculcating function in these cases, see Brown,
supra note 68, at 1117-20.
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edy, desegregation, upon it is necessary to start with an examination of
Green v. County School Board. 9 The Court's opinion in Brown 1190 re-
quired public schools to effectuate a transition to a "racially nondiscrimi-
natory school system.""1 The precise parameters of what was meant by a
racially nondiscriminatory school system were originally left to the discre-
tion of school authorities who had the primary responsibility for assessing
and solving this problem. Many states and school systems employed vari-
ous methods to avoid compliance with the constitutional duty. 2 By 1964,
only 2.14% of the black students in seven of the eleven states in the deep
South attended desegregated schools.93 Measures used by southern states
to thwart efforts to desegregate schools included the denial of state funds
to schools attended by pupils of different races, threats to close the public
schools in the event they were integrated, delegation of control of the pub-
lic schools to the governor or the state legislature in hopes of frustrating
federal court orders, abolition of compulsory schooling, tuition grants for
those who did not wish to attend integrated schools, criminal penalties for
teaching in or attending an integrated school, and firing of teachers who
advocated desegregation. 4
The Virginia Constitution, for example, was amended in 1956 to au-
thorize the General Assembly and local governing bodies to approlriate
funds to assist students who would rather go to nonsectarian private
schools over public schools. The General Assembly also met in special
session and enacted legislation to close any public schools where white and
black children were enrolled together, to cut off state funds to such
schools, to pay tuition grants to children in nonsectarian private schools,
and to extend state retirement benefits to teachers in newly created private
89 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
90 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
91 Id. at 301.
"2 See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (invalidating a scheme by Prince Edward
County in which the county closed its public schools and at the same time contributed grants of public
funds to white children to attend private schools); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963)
(invalidating a procedure which allowed students to transfer from a school where their race was in the
minority to a school where their race was in the majority).
93 HAROLD W. HORowrTz & KENNETH L. KARsT, LAW, LAWYERS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
239-40 (1969).
See, e.g., RAvrrCH, supra note 33, at 133. For more details about delays and obstruction of
the implementation of the Brown opinions, see Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of
School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 13-28
(1975).
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schools.9" Even though the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in 1959 that the
legislation closing racially mixed schools and cutting off funds to such
schools violated Virginia's Constitution, the pupil scholarship program
continued to operate. 98
Arkansas was another state where resistance to the Court's opinions in
the Brown cases was particularly strong. The state legislature passed sev-
eral statutes in an effort to maintain school segregation.97 In Cooper v.
Aaron9" the Supreme Court rejected a request by the Little Rock School
Board for a two and one-half year delay in implementing a court-ordered
desegregation program. The school board had sought the delay because of
"extreme public hostility" towards desegregation engendered by the Gov-
ernor of Arkansas, who dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard
to block the school board's planned desegregation of a local high school.
Against the background of continuing massive resistance to the desegre-
gation of public schools, the Supreme Court rendered its 1968 opinion in
Green v. County School Board.99 The Court rejected the argument of the
New Kent County School Board that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
require compulsory integration. 100 Animating the Court's decision to order
racial balancing was the resistance that the Brown opinions had encoun-
tered. 10 The Court's explicit response to the school board, however, was
See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1964).
See Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959).
'7 For a discussion of several statutes the Arkansas legislature adopted to maintain school segre-
gation, see Raymond T. Diamond, Confrontation as Rejoinder to the Compromise: Reflections of the
Little Rock Desegregation Crisis, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 151, 155-56 (1989).
98 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
99 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
100 Id. at 437. Under the "freedom-of-choice" plan, no whites had enrolled in the black school
and only 15% of blacks had enrolled in the white school. Id. at 441. The Court noted that "transition
to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought about."
Id. at 436.
One of the provisions included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited federal financial assis-
tance from being given to programs or activities engaged in discrimination. The Department of
Health, Education and Welfare issued regulations addressing racial discrimination in federally aided
school systems as directed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, and in the statement of policies or guidelines, the
Department's Office of Education established standards for eligibility for federal funds of school sys-
tems in the process of desegregation. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.76 (1967). "Freedom of
choice" plans were seen as acceptable under these regulations. See Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34 n.2; see
also LINO A. GRAGLIA, DIsAsTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DEcIsIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS (1976).
20' For example, the Court noted that the school board had not taken the first step to comply
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that "the constitutional rights of Negro school children articulated in
Brown I permit no less than this; and it was to this end that Brown II
commanded school boards to bend their efforts.""0 2 Thus the duty to de-
segregate public schools was born.
From the Court's opinion in Green there, are two justifications for or-
dering integration. First is the widespread resistance to compliance with
the Court's Brown opinions by state, local, and educational officials. The
second justification for racial balancing is to be found in the passages of
the Court's opinion in Brown I. I have already pointed to the passages in
Brown I that articulated the tangible harms of de jure segregation.'" 3 De-
segregation was therefore also justified as a means to remedy the cognitive,
psychological, educational, and emotional harm inflicted by segregation on
African-Americans; 0 4 which is to say, it is a means to remedy a perceived
deficit condition of African-Americans.
It is obvious from the Court's opinion in Green that the Supreme Court
also saw segregation as making African-Americans less than whites. If the
Supreme Court had based desegregation on the firm belief that African-
Americans were the equals of Caucasians, then both blacks and whites
would have been considered as beneficiaries of the remedies. For the
Court to have avoided replicating the message about the inferiority of Af-
rican-Americans in desegregation, the Court would have also articulated
how de jure segregation harmed Caucasians as well. The Court needed to
recognize that both black and white school children were the beneficiaries
of the interracial contact desegregation afforded. The Court, however, did
not view interracial exposure of Caucasians to African-Americans as a
benefit for white students. Thus, desegregation becomes necessary pre-
cisely because African-Americans are not the equals of Caucasians.
with the Court's order in the Brown cases until "11 years after Brown I was decided and 10 years
after Brown II directed the making of a 'prompt and reasonable start.'" Green, 391 U.S. at 438. The
Court also quotes from its opinion in Griffin, 377 U.S. at 234, stating "[t]he time for mere 'deliberate
speed' has run out." Green, 391 U.S. at 438. Even though the Court specifically states that it does not
adopt the views of the United States Com .mission on Civil Rights, it does note their conclusion that
among the reasons freedom of choice plans may not work are both the fear and the reality of retalia-
tion and hostility by the white community against Negro families who choose to attend formerly all-
white schools. Id. at 440 n.5.
102 Id. at 437-38.
108 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
14 For an argument that justifies desegregation on the basis of eliminating the distortion in the
socializing function of public schools, see-Brown, supra note 68.
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The use by the Supreme Court of a pejorative analytical framework to
justify desegregation as the primary remedy for de jure segregation meant
that the desegregation era was actually performing two apparently incon-
sistent functions. At the same time that the country was dismantling de
jure segregation and its concomitant message of African-American inferi-
ority, it was also constructing a policy of integration which carried its own
message of African-American inferiority. The very remedies that were un-
dertaken in an attempt to eliminate a belief in African-American inferi-
ority were also-like segregation that had preceded it-standing as sym-
bols for it.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY THE RHETORICAL POSITION OF THOSE
SEEKING To CONVERT DESEGREGATION LAWSUITS TO QUALITY
EDUCATION LAWSUITS IS STRONGER
The analytical framework utilized by the Supreme Court in desegrega-
tion cases to order school systems to desegregate has rested primarily upon
two justifications. The first is the notion of African-American inferiority
and the second is the widespread attempts by state, local and school offi-
cials to avoid complying with the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown I
and Brown II. Justice Kennedy's Freeman opinion noted that partial
withdrawal would not be granted unless there had been satisfactory com-
pliance with the district court decree in those aspects of the system where
partial withdrawal was being sought."' 5 Because of the restrictive nature
of this framework, proponents of continuing desegregation are forced into
a very narrow set of arguments which they can make for maintaining de
jure segregation. Ultimately, their arguments for maintaining desegrega-
tion require the assertion of distrust of whites and a belief in notions of
black inferiority.
As discussed earlier, the issue of converting desegregation lawsuits into
quality education lawsuits is articulated against a cultural backdrop in
which African-Americans have long been concerned about receiving fair
treatment for their children in public schools. Skepticism regarding treat-
ment at the hands of the dominant group has always been a part of the
African-American deliberations about whether it is best to seek separate
as opposed to integrated education for black school children. The principal
105 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446.
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argument against racially separate schools has been the systematic vulner-
ability of black school children to inadequate funding. The principal argu-
ment against racially integrated schools has been the belief that those
schools will be structured to cater to the educational interest of whites and
relegate the educational interests of African-Americans to a secondary
position.
When the discussion concerns conversion of desegregation lawsuits to
quality education lawsuits, the issue of distrust of whites is diminished in
importance. One of the primary benefits of integrated education from the
perspective of the African-American community has been its ability to
prevent the vulnerability of African-Americans to systematic funding dep-
rivations. Prior to Freeman v. Pitts, advocates of racially separate educa-
tion in the African-American community had a hard time rebutting the
argument that separate education left black school children systematically
vulnerable to the deprivation of educational resources. If federal district
courts maintain partial supervision over a school system to assure equal
quality of education, including equal funding, then not only is one of the
primary justifications for integration attenuated, but also one of the pri-
mary criticisms of separate education is also eliminated."' 6
Even though many advocates of desegregation believe that it benefits all
students, the Court's analytical framework does not provide for that as a
basis for desegregation.'07 Multicultural advocates who see the benefits to
all students of cross-cultural education based on mutual respect and admi-
ration by both racial groups will find little help in the Supreme Court's
school desegregation jurisprudence.'08 Proponents of continued desegrega-
tion are limited to legal arguments that require them to assert resistance
to the district court's desegregation orders by governmental officials in the
106 It is true that a further argument could be made that whites may be disinclined to continue to
adequately fund the predominately black schools once all federal court supervision is finally released.
The major force of that argument, however, would not be felt in an attempt to convert school desegre-
gation lawsuits into quality education lawsuits. Rather it will be felt when termination of all, not just
partial, federal court supervision is sought.
101 Studies indicate that adults who attend integrated elementary and secondary schools are more
comfortable in integrated work and social settings than graduates of segregated schools. James S.
Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
1463, 1626-27 (1990).
508 See James A. Banks, Multicultural Education: Characteristics and Goals, in MULTICUL-
TURAL EDUCATION: ISSUES AND PERSPwCmvEs 20 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks
eds., 1989).
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form of lack of good faith or notions that African-Americans have not
been cured of their deficient condition.'09 In fact, given the Supreme
Court's de jure segregation jurisprudence, if mutual respect and admira-
tion by blacks and whites had existed at all, then the predicates for order-
ing desegregation would not have existed in the first place.
The Supreme Court's analytical framework for desegregation forces its
proponents to couch their position in notions of continued deficiencies of
African-Americans which can only be cured by exposure to Caucasians.
The Supreme Court's analytical framework for ordering racial balancing
presupposes the inability of African-Americans to resolve their own
problems. On the other hand, proponents who argue for the conversion to
quality education lawsuits are able to stress the abilities of African-
Americans to obtain an adequate education in predominantly black
schools. As a result, they can stress themes of black independence, black
competence, and racial pride-arguments which proponents of continued
desegregation are hard-pressed to make.
From the perspective of the African-American community, the rhetori-
cal superiority of the pro-separatist position is dear. They can argue from
a position of racial pride, while pro-integrationists are forced to frame
their arguments by rejecting the ability of African-Americans to solve
their own problems. This amounts to an inversion of the arguments re-
garding racial separation in public schools that existed before Brown v.
Board of Education. Then proponents of separation were generally seen
as those who supported the notion of African-American inferiority. 110 The
position of being able to argue both notions of mutual respect and Afri-
can-American equality is now on the side of those whose arguments will
increase racial separation of public school students.
109 For a discussion of issues surrounding the termination of de jure segregation decrees, see
Kevin Brown, Recent Developments in the Termination of School Desegregation Decrees, 26 IND. L.
REv. 867 (1993).
110 Brown, supra note 87, at 11-14.
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